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Abstract 
When countries are in times of limited financial resources the provision of public 
funds to active labour market policies should receive close attention from the gov-
ernments and become as effective as possible. This aim should be always grounded 
in evidence criteria and not in political insights or ideological social constructions. 
This paper aims to provide some data and potential conclusions in order to deliver a 
modest contribution to the evidence-based debate on ALMP policy making in Portugal. 
The analysis was made over two variables: the public expenditure on self-employment 
creation measures and the number of self-employment positions created. The results 
suggest that there is a weak linear correlation between the two variables. This might 
point to an inefficiency in the use of public funds; or in other hand, it may mean that 
public expenditure is only remotely responsible for the creation of self-employment 
positions and, therefore, that there are other variables (or reasons) that explain the 
phenomenon. 
Keywords: self-employment, active labour market policies, employment, unemploy-
ment
Resumo 
Quando os países experimentam tempos de escassez de recursos financeiros a alo-
cação de fundos públicos destinados a políticas ativas de emprego, deve merecer uma 
atenção incisiva pelos governos e tornar-se o mais eficiente possível. Este objetivo 
deve ser sempre alicerçado em critérios de evidência e não em instintos políticos ou 
construções sociais ideológicas. Pretende-se com este texto, obter alguns dados e po-
tenciais conclusões, de modo a podermos oferecer uma modesta contribuição para o 
debate baseado em evidências sobre a construção de políticas ativas de emprego, em 
Portugal. A análise incidiu sobre duas variáveis: a despesa pública em medidas ativas 
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de criação do próprio emprego, ou empresa, e o número efetivo de empregos assim 
criados. Os resultados sugerem que existe uma correlação linear fraca entre estas duas 
variáveis. Tal pode eventualmente indicar uma ineficiência na utilização dos fundos 
públicos. Ou, por outro lado, pode significar que a despesa pública é apenas remota-
mente responsável pela criação do próprio emprego e que, portanto, existem outras 
variáveis (ou razões) que explicam o fenómeno.
Palavras-chave: autoemprego, políticas ativas de emprego, emprego, desemprego
Introduction
The rise of unemployment rates all over Europe, as a result of a ma-
jor recession mainly later 2008, has inevitably carried labour market 
policies back to core of public policy debate. The main aim of all gov-
ernments is to move the equilibrium (OECD, 1998) of public expendi-
ture on labour market policies away from passive measures towards 
spending on Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP) and so help to 
reduce structural unemployment. This was verified by Card, Kluve 
& Weber (2010) as they find that ALMP tend to have larger effects in 
periods of slow economic growing and higher unemployment.
Thus, ALMP are currently the main public gears to smooth the so-
cial effects and dissimilarities resulting from unemployment.  In 
terms of activation policies, OECD (2015) includes in ALMP all social 
expenditure (other than education) which is aimed to improve the 
beneficiary’s prospect of finding gainful employment or to increase 
their earning capacity. From the point of view of labour demand, ex-
amples of these ALMP are start-up incentives and other self-employ-
ment measures. 
The available data, from the main European statistical providers, 
consistently show a decrease in the amount of self-employment cre-
ation in Europe. However, in some countries public expenditure in 
self-employment creation has risen every year. Yet relatively little is 
known about the determinants of self-employment, especially the ef-
fects of government policy instruments on the self-employment rate 
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(Parker & Robson, 2004). Moreover, the huge amount of literature, 
studies and research produced on this subject repeatedly displays 
dissimilar conclusions.  
Setting self-employment creation through Portuguese public meas-
ures as the dependant variable, and public expenditure as the inde-
pendent variable (and grounded on those findings and studies) this 
paper seeks to analyse whether or not this ALMP produces the de-
sired outcomes. This paper aims to provide some figures and poten-
tial conclusions in order to provide a small contribution to the evi-
dence-based debate on ALMP policy making in Portugal.
1. Theoretical Framework and Studies in Measuring ALMP Ef-
fects
One of the most recent typology for ALMP was proposed by Brown 
and Koettl (2015). These authors divide the ALMP into three catego-
ries related with the target: labour demand, labour supply and la-
bour market matching. This latter category aggregates the public pol-
icies that provide incentives for creating employment and includes 
self-employment creation measures and/or business start-up support. 
The programmes (or measures) can change from country to country 
according to assorted criteria, for example, the sort of payment and 
the level of support or training provided (Cueto and Mato, 2006). The 
model of subsidization can be a fixed payment or a lump-sum grant 
(idem). Simultaneously, the scheme can offer further services such 
as training (voluntary or as a prerequisite for participation) and/or 
other support (advisory mechanisms) (ibidem).
This paper is focused on the labour market matching category.
*
Today the ALMP have become one of the most important elements 
of the European Employment Strategy (EES), and are highly recom-
mended as a tool to boost employment (OECD/European Union, 2015), 
but there are different conclusions and discussions about their real 
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effectiveness (Jovan and Jonel, 2011). Evidence about the impact of 
ALMPs on unemployment is currently grounded in macro or micro-
economic frameworks (Martin, 2014). In this paper the distinction is 
not made, as it is in the literature review, as this paper aims to take a 
most likely holistic view about this social phenomenon. 
In 1996, in the OECD’s framework, Robert Fay conducted a study re-
viewing the evidence from programmes evaluations on the effective-
ness of some ALMP to help unemployed to return to labour market. 
According this author there are policies that work for the most part 
of unemployed people. However the capability of ALMP to aid a large 
numbers of unemployed, at any given time, is restricted. In part, this 
relates to decreasing returns in extensive programmes (especially in 
training policies). In part, this is linked to labour market distortions 
that can be introduced or intensified with extensive programmes. In 
contrast, a large number of small well-targeted programmes may be 
costly if there are large fixed costs to start new programmes. Among 
other recommendations he identified the following policy implica-
tions based on results of assessments of public aid for starting an 
enterprise: a) these programmes only work for a small subset of the 
unemployed population (usually, these look to be men, mostly under 
40 with relatively higher education levels and whose current status 
of unemployment is relatively short );  b) these programmes or meas-
ures may be better designed and used for the relatively short-term 
unemployed; c) it is unclear if the financing format has a significant 
impact on the outcome, because these individuals are liquidity-con-
strained, so an initial lump-sum (e.g. receiving the overall unemploy-
ment subsidy in one single sum ) may be more effective; d) those who 
get money from other sources, e.g. family and/or friends, may be 
more driven to survive.  
Elmeskov et al. (1998) worked over annual data from 19 OECD coun-
tries in the period 1983–1995. The variable used to proxy active pol-
icies was the public expenditure on ALMP per unemployed person 
relative to the output per capita. The study found that ALMP spend-
ing has a negative impact on the unemployment rate, yet is only mar-
ginally significant.
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A study conduct by Heckman, et al. (1999) upon ALMP, revealed that 
these programmes are often ineffective and for most groups of par-
ticipants the benefits are discreet or even modest. According to these 
authors, many ALMP initiatives do not have a positive cost-benefit 
test.  Therefore, there are two explanations why the private and so-
cial advantages of these programmes are generally small: first, the 
per-capita expenditures are usually small, relative to the deficits that 
these programmes are being asked to address (in order to generate 
extended gains they would have to be related with very large inter-
nal rates of return); second, services are targeted toward relatively 
unskilled individuals (Heckman et al., 1999). This last finding was 
corroborated in latter studies (Albiol et al.2015) that confirmed that 
self-employed people need more basic and specialized (or technical) 
skills than salaried employees.
Also in 1999, Nickell and Layard conducted a study over two 6-year 
averages from 20 OECD countries in the period 1983–1994. The ALMP 
variable studied was the spending per unemployed person as a per-
centage of GDP per member of the labour force. This study concluded 
that spending on ALMP has a negative impact on the unemployment 
rate and no major effect on the employment-to-population rate.
In a study of self-employment firms carried out in Germany, Pfeiffer 
and Reize (2000), found a lack of any significant impacts on employ-
ment growth and a significant negative impact on firm survival. The 
results do not seem to support the effectiveness and efficiency of 
bridging grants as an instrument for creating employment through 
the promotion of self-employment from unemployment. One rea-
son for this result is likely to be the design of the programme, which 
seems to support opportunistic or myopic behaviour in the group of 
unemployed persons who received bridging subsidies (Pfeiffer and 
Reize, 2000).
Martin and Grubb (2001) in their study of evaluations, conducted 
between 1985 and 2000, concluded that the impact of some public 
measures being implemented in the labour market do not have en-
couraging results (in terms of increasing employment and earnings). 
They do however underline that there are some programmes that 
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provide positive indicators, such as counselling, subsidies for em-
ployment in the private sector and training, but with a note that the 
effects are small. The same conclusion was verified ten years later by 
Vlandas (2011).
Card et al. (2010) stated similar conclusions as they argue that sub-
sidised public sector job programmes are generally less successful 
than other forms of ALMP. These researchers have assembled and 
analysed a sample of impact estimates from 207 studies on ALMP. 
They argue that it is central to differentiate between impacts along 
time horizons since the end of the programmes or measures, and to 
consider how the time profile of impacts varies by the category of 
ALMP. They also studied the importance of unemployed heterogene-
ity, and look for evidence that specific subcategories of unemployed 
may benefit more or less from particular categories of programs. 
With regard to the impacts of different types of ALMP, Card et al. 
(2010) find that the time outlines of “work first” style job search sup-
port and sanction/threat programs differ from the profiles of “human 
capital” style training and private sector employment grants (e.g. pri-
vate unemployment assurances). Work first programs are likely to 
have higher short term effects, while training programs have small 
(or in some cases even negative) short term impacts. This team also 
stated that public sector employment programs have small or even 
negative program impacts at all-time horizons.  With regard to the 
state of the labour market, they find that ALMP tend to have larger 
impacts in periods of slow economic development and higher unem-
ployment rates.  
In 2002, Calmfors et al. among other findings concluded that: a) pub-
lic measures only slightly help to match supply, b) demand for labour 
and subsidized employment positions results in a high level of sub-
stitution (displacement), and c) training measures are not effective. 
In general, public measures help to reduce unemployment, but at the 
same time do not have an impact on the aggregate level of employ-
ment. The biggest impact was achieved in increasing activity level. 
A further important conclusion of the study is that the programmes 
lose their effectiveness with an increase in volume, so, in terms of 
policy making, it is advisable to keep the volume at a low level.
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Using panel data for 15 industrialized countries in the 1990s, Estevão 
(2003) found that ALMP raised employment rates in the business sec-
tor. He found that   direct subsidies for job creation were the further-
most effective, among several ALMP. According this author, whether 
ALMP are cost-effective from a public expenditure point of view re-
mains to be verified, but they are not alternatives for broader and 
holistic policy reforms. Although the global positive impact of ALMP 
on employment rates, their budgetary effort is high for all countries 
and they are likely to be conditional on diminishing earnings as em-
ployment rates increase. At certain employment levels ALMP could 
recuperate their cost (or not) if they results are to place the users into 
employments and these benefits are removed.
Using annual data from 19 OECD countries over the 1985–1999 
period, Boone and Van Ours (2004) assessed the impact of several 
types of active measures on the unemployment rate and the employ-
ment-to-population rates. They found that expenditure on labour 
market training programmes has the largest (positive) impact on la-
bour market outcomes. However, public expenditure on public em-
ployment services looks like to   reduce the unemployment rate but 
does not affect the employment-to-population rate. Public expendi-
ture on employment incentives looks to be largely ineffective for re-
duce the unemployment rate or improving the employment-to-pop-
ulation rates.
Studying the Swedish labour market, Henrekson (2005) settled that 
the structure of public incentives for self-employment has a negative 
impact on the return to entrepreneurial behaviour both in relative 
and absolute terms. The reasons are due mainly to the taxation of en-
trepreneurial income, muted savings incentives and strict and rigid 
laws on labour security.
Atherton (2006) argued that the challenges for public intervention 
and funds allocation to entrepreneurships and/or start-ups are two- 
fold. The first is to assess whether the start-up has genuine potential 
for sustainability. Start-ups that are weak in both capability and busi-
ness proposition do not in themselves present a case for public fund-
ing (in that the risk of failure is likely to be high in such speculative 
88
R-LEGO - Revista Lusófona de Economia e Gestão das Organizações, N.º 5, 2017
and marginal ventures). In these cases, non-provision of public sup-
port, and perhaps advice and guidance not to start, can be the most 
efficient allocation of public funds.  The second one is to identify un-
der what circumstances public intervention can improve prospects 
not only for future start-up, but also for survival and growth.  
    The European Commission (2006) in a study about the employment 
in Europe, argue that some ALMP specifically, employment grants 
(or start-up loans), together with counselling, can promote or en-
couraging self-employment and/or the creation of small enterprises. 
Though, assessments strongly suggest that this sort of programmes 
seems to help only a marginal target of unemployed, namely relative-
ly young men usually with higher levels of education, which already 
have a trend to have the required entrepreneurial skills and motiva-
tion to survive in an entrepreneurial framework.
Baumgartner and Caliendo (2007) conducted a research on two 
German programmes, in order to estimate the effectiveness and ef-
ficiency of the public expenditure. They concluded that one of the 
programme’s funding of individuals  (to start self-employment)  not 
only helped them to enhance their employment status and earn more 
income, but also saved public financial resources by reducing spend-
ing on unemployment benefits.  
Caliendo et al. (2008) assessed the employment effects of job-creation 
schemes on the participating individuals in Germany. In general the 
findings of these researchers are quite disappointing because most of 
the effects are insignificant or negative. Participation in programmes 
does not help the unemployed people to reintegrate into regular (un-
subsidised) employment. Besides, if the analysis relies over cumulat-
ed effects in the full observation period and over a cost-benefit anal-
ysis, the scarce positive aspects are likely to disappear completely. 
The relatively high costs of job-creation measures make it likely that 
these programmes have to be rated as failures from the cost-benefit 
side.  This would clearly help to judge the performance of job-crea-
tion measures at a deeper level in all countries.  
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In 2009, Scott Shane concluded that it is bad public policy to encour-
age entrepreneurship. He argued mainly that: a) there is no evidence 
that unemployed people create too few or the wrong businesses in 
the absence of public intervention, and a lot of evidence that these 
policies lead people to start marginal businesses that are likely to fail, 
have little economic impact and generates minor employment posi-
tions; b) there is no evidence that creation of new enterprise causes 
economic growth; rather, economic growth probably causes people 
to start businesses; c)  new firms do not create more jobs than exist-
ing firms; to get to 50 percent of net new jobs created by “new” firms, 
we have to consider all firms that are nine years old and younger to 
be “new” and d) the jobs in start-ups pay lower wages, offer scarcer 
benefits, and are more likely to disappear over time than jobs in ex-
isting companies.
Koellinger and Minniti (2009) provided evidence that substantial 
unemployment benefits are negatively related to emerging entre-
preneurship, regardless of entrepreneurial motivation and form. So, 
higher unemployment benefits tend to reduce the whole entrepre-
neurial tendency of a country. The results of this two authors sug-
gests that if entrepreneurial activity is significant for economic pro-
gress, then the opportunity costs of unemployment assistances may 
be higher than it is usually supposed in labour economics studies.
Kluve (2010) argued in a different way. Training measures are likely 
to have a modest impact on employment rates improvement. Com-
pared with training, subsidies and support programmes to employ-
ment had a 50% positive effect. The analysis made by this author over 
96 academic studies from 19 countries, presented a positive finding 
in modern forms of active programs that drive the marked differ-
ential pattern of program success. Modern private sector incentive 
schemes and programmes are those ones that work successfully and 
that modern types of “Services and Sanctions” are the mostly effec-
tive. It also seems that ALMP are more likely to be successful when 
the unemployment rate is higher.  
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Forslund et al. (2011) verified that depending on the phase of the 
economic cycle (Cueto and Mato, 2006), different measures have dif-
ferent effects. They showed that in periods of recession, the greatest 
effects are provided by training programmes than other public meas-
ures. This same conclusion has been confirmed latter on by Vlandas 
(2011) and Cho and Honorati (2014).
In the same year, Tokila (2011) studied public support for entrepre-
neurship in Finland from 1988 up to 2004. For this author, the focus 
of public supporting measures or policies should be focused to busi-
ness success instead of to the number of business entries. The main 
results consider the existence of the deadweight effect (at the project 
level, deadweight is recognised and defined as the degree to which 
projects would have been implemented even without public subsi-
dies; thus, deadweight indicates wasted public spending. If a large 
deadweight effect is observed, then the measure or programme is 
not efficient). In addition the results show that start-up grants have a 
positive effect on the duration of self-employment. This deadweight 
effect decreases the positive effects on outcomes. Tokila (2011) ar-
gues that even if ALMP are well planned, deadweight spending is not 
fully inevitable because the public bodies that grant the subsidies, 
never has complete information about a firm’s development in the 
absence of those subsidies.  
A comprehensive study carried out by ECORYS and IZA in 2012 for 
the European Commission, and over the 28 member states of Euro-
pean Union, found many disparities among countries. Nevertheless 
the ALMP related with enterprise creations and self-employment are, 
in a European Union framework, a small spending class for a specif-
ic group, and the public expenditure has not been expanded much 
during the crisis. An explanation may be that throughout a crisis, 
unemployed are perhaps more hesitant to start a business. Moreo-
ver countries reforms in this particular ALMP for business creation 
have focused mainly on reducing administrative requirements. So, 
start-up incentives and self-employment measures seem to be more 
suitable when there are economy picks up, although then the risk of 
deadweight loss (Tokila, 2011) is bigger as well.
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The study carried out by Román et al. (2013) established that if public 
expenditure is considered an ALMP (and start-up public incentives 
are intended to improve the chances of unemployed people moving 
back into labour market), they can be considered acceptable tools 
only in periods of moderate unemployment. In contrast, if such pub-
lic funds or incentives are considered as an instrument to fight eco-
nomic recession and high unemployment rates, their effectiveness is 
dubious at the very least. In other words, public expenditure planned 
to move the unemployed back into the labour market might be det-
rimental for employment rights and the social protection of workers 
as it favours the expansion of atypical forms of employment (that are 
outside the sphere of labour laws). Therefore, to avoid some unex-
pected (and undesired) effects, the interaction of diverse macro level 
institutional factors (i.e., labour market institutions and the business 
cycle) should be measured when defining the regulatory framework.
More recently Brown and Koettl (2015) take on a study assessing 
the cost-effectiveness of ALMP. They concluded that ALMP that are 
designed to create employment perform much better in terms of 
cost-effectiveness (mainly during economic recoveries), whereby the 
outsiders’ attachment to the labour market is strengthened. Simulta-
neously, the outflow out of unemployment is supported and labour 
market persistence is reduced.
Escudero (2015) carried out an empirical analysis that involved an 
aggregate impact approach over a pooled cross country and time-se-
ries database from 31 advanced economies during the period 1985–
2010.  The main findings concluded that ALMP matter at the aggre-
gate level. The most positive results were found in: public spending 
in training, employment incentives, supported employment and re-
habilitation and direct job creation. In particular, public spending 
in start-up incentives or self-employment creation are effective but 
only in dropping the unemployment rate of both population groups 
and in improving the employment rate of the overall population.  
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2.  Empirical Analysis    
All political decisions should be grounded in evidence. To avoid 
changes in policies from one government to another and to overcome 
repeated political blunders with societal impacts (Fay, 1999) and 
costs, social policy initiatives should be assembled on evidence-based 
criteria (Haskins & Baron, 2011), provided by empirical studies. 
However it should be acknowledged that when unemployment is high 
and demand for labour is low, high net impacts from ALMP should 
not be expected (O’Leary, 2001).  Despite this statement the impor-
tance of carefully evaluating ALMP should be emphasized, so that 
public funds can be used efficiently while pursuing the social aim of 
returning the unemployed to the labour market (O’Leary, 2001).
As stated before this paper aims to provide some figures in order to 
add a small input to the evidence-based debate on ALMP policy in 
Portugal. To pursue this aim, the analysis used the data provided by 
the EUROSTAT Labour Force Survey (LFS) (2015) and the Instituto do 
Emprego e Formação Profissional (IEFP). The chosen data go from 
2005 to 2013; there are no breaks in series and the data cover the 
crisis peak (2011-2013) in Portugal. In this text, as ALMP is the study 
object, the choice was made to look at Portuguese public measures 
that lead to self-employment (promoted by unemployed people) in 
two merged formats (i.e. self-employment creation measures and 
business start-up support).This is the dependent variable (Vlandas 
2011). As this paper aims to analyse the use of public funds allocated 
to promote self-employment the public expenditure made by IEFP on 
this ALMP was set as the independent variable.
2.1. Evolution of Self-employment and Public Expenditure
The LFS (2015) provides some clear data about the evolution in the 
total number of self-employed people in Portugal, from 2005 to 2013. 
Table 1. shows the total of self-employed people in Portugal.  Table 2. 
shows the total of public funds allocated to create new self-employ-
ment positions, and the number of new self-employment positions 
created with the public funds (through IEFP’s measures). 
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At national level (from Table 1. and Graphic 1.) some distinct stages 
can be identified.  From 2005 to 2008 the total number of self-em-
ployed Portuguese people remains more or less steady above 900,000, 
however with some tendency to decline. From 2008 to 2013 the ab-
solute number drops to 700,000 people registered as self-employed, 
with a more marked decline from 2011 to 2013.
In the same period (2005-2013) Portuguese public expenditure on 
self-employment creation measures shows a different performance. 
Table 2. and Graphic 2.  shows that from 2005 to 2007 the public 
funds allocated to self-employment creation measures remained 
more or less steady at €3.5 M annually. Then an intense decrease was 
registered from 2007 to 2009, followed by a huge growth in to 2010, 
to more than €7 M. In the opposite direction, the years 2011 and 2012 
registered an deep reduction, to slightly over €1 M, and remained at 
almost the same value in 2013.  Despite the unexpected growth of 
public expenditure in 2010 and 2011, the number of self-employment 
positions created still decreased. This might indicate an ineffective 
use of public funds and/or an also unexpected rise in the effective 
cost per position created? The phenomenon can be checked in Graph-
ic 3. This shows the evolution of the annual self-employed positions 
created through IEFP measures and the public expenditure used to 
achieve it. The evolution follows closely the total of self-employed 
Portuguese individuals, with the exception of 2009, where the num-
ber grows slightly, but in 2010 the decreasing trend returns.
With these figures, some questions arise. Is there any relation be-
tween public expenditure and self-employment positions created? 
Is the creation of self-employment positions due only to public ex-
penditure? Why does an increase in public expenditure not lead to 
an equivalent growth in self-employment positions creation?
2.2. Data Analysis
There is a clear downward trend in the number of people that chose 
self-employment as a solution to fight against unemployment. This 
is a reality for the overall number of people in the country, but also 
for the unemployed who start their own employment or business. 
94
R-LEGO - Revista Lusófona de Economia e Gestão das Organizações, N.º 5, 2017
 Simultaneously, public expenditure in self-employment measures or 
programmes has been falling since 2010, and in 2013 it represents 
one third of the 2005 amount and one seventh when compared with 
2010.
Considering there are two variables, the first analysis was made 
based on a scatterplot. The results in Graph 4. shows the dispersion 
of the values. The trend line displays a two period moving average: 
the first period a relative linearity and the second a non-linear trend. 
There are no outliers.
The descriptive statistics for both variables are displayed in Table 
3. To check the normality, the Shapiro-Wilk Test was used. As can 
be seen, the p values for both variables (.531 and .146) of the Shap-
iro-Wilk Test 2 are > .05, thus the alternative hypothesis (Ha) can be 
rejected and it can be concluded that the data come from a normal 
distribution (George & Mallery, 2010).  The kurtosis values (-.807 and 
-1.813) for each of the variables also indicate a normal univariate but 
flatter (or platykurtic) distribution. 3 
With those confirmations the Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficient (Pearson’s correlation) was used in order to assess the 
strength and direction of association that exists between the two var-
iables measured, to determine to what extent the variables are cor-
related (Field, 2013).
Table 4. shows the results of the Pearson Correlation test.  The value 
of r is .291. Although technically this is a positive correlation, but the 
uphill linear relationship between the two variables is weak (Field, 
2013).   In other words, there is a weak correlation between public 
expenditure and self-employment creation. The question whether 
the correlation is real (or statistically significant) was also assessed. 
Using a α = 0.054, and looking up to p = .446, it can be concluded that 
the correlation is not statistically significant (Corty, 2013). The effect 
size of the correlation is assessed by the coefficient of determinations 
2  Ho: The distribution of the data is normal and Ha: The distribution of the data is not normal
3  The values for asymmetry and kurtosis between -2 and +2 are considered acceptable in order 
to prove normal univariate distribution (George & Mallery, 2010).
4  Because is the value mostly used in social sciences (Corty, 2013).
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(r2) and is equal to .085. This means that only 8.5% of self-employ-
ment creation is explained by public expenditure (conversely, 91.5% 
of the variation in mean reading scores cannot be explained.) and 
therefore is most likely explain by other variables.  
Conclusions
This paper started by revising the studies, research reports and lit-
erature available. The conclusions presented by several authors are 
not unanimous. There are mainly three sets of inferences. The first 
presents self-employment creation actions and programmes as ac-
tivation measures that are helpful to overcome unemployment and 
to use public funds.  The second gatherings the opposite, and shows 
this ALMP as inefficient, from several points of view, but mainly as a 
waste of public expenditure. The third set of conclusions is directed 
to the need to establish more irrefutable studies and to implement 
additional research.
In the light of these findings, this study starts by analysing the evolu-
tion of self-employment creation and the amount of public expendi-
ture over the years. 
The first conclusion states that there is a downward trend in the num-
ber of people that select self-employment as a response to unemploy-
ment. This is a reality for the overall number of people in the country, 
but also for unemployed people who start their own employment or 
business. Simultaneously, public expenditure on self-employment 
measure or programmes has been is dropping since 2010 and in 2013 
was one third of the 2005 amount and one seventh when compared 
with 2010.
The second conclusion addresses the apparent absence of, or weak, 
linear correlation between the two variables. This may possibly in-
dicate an inefficiency of public funds usage, as argued by Heckman, 
Lalonde & Smith (1999) and Pfeiffer & Reize (2000). In other words, 
the statistical results may indicate that public funds are slightly re-
sponsible for the self-employment creation positions and perhaps 
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there are other variables that explain the phenomenon, such as, for 
instance, better economic performance (Shane, 2009). It is possible 
also that we are facing a deadweight effect (Tokila, 2011).  Thus, it is 
also likely that the opportunity cost associate with public funds allo-
cated to self-employment creation measures (with the format they 
are planned nowadays), would be better used, for instance, in job 
creation measures (Estevão, 2003) as well in counselling, subsidies 
for employment in the private sector or training (Martin and Grubb, 
2001).
Furthermore the statistical results may show that these findings fol-
low closely the conclusion of Román, Congregado & Millán (2013), 
which established that public incentives for self-employment can 
be considered acceptable tools only in periods of modest unemploy-
ment, which is not the case in the period studied (2005-2013), as it 
was in fact a period of resilient and raising unemployment rates.
Finally, more comprehensive studies and evaluations are needed to 
assess in depth if the use of public funds to promote self-employment 
is a major ALMP or should become a fringe or a residual measure.
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Table 1. Total  Self Employed Individuals in Portugal  (2005-2013)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
953 911,1 913 908,1 870,3 811,3 746,9 723,1 710,3Total Self employed Individuals in Portugal  (x 1000)
 Source: EUROSTAT/Labour Force Survey   
Table 2. Total Public Expenditure in IEFP’s Self Employment Creation Measures and 
Self Employed Positions Created Through IEFP Measures (2005-2013)
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
3,64 3,76 3,64 3,15 2,54 7,07 5,17 1,29 1,14 Total Public Expenditure in IEFP's Self Employment Creation Measures  (Million €)
8553 9846 9519 6472 8847 6670 3832 2886 2848  Self employed Positions Created trough IEFP Measures (Public Expenditure)
Source: EUROSTAT/Labour Force Survey and IEFP data
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
 x = Public Expenditure y =  Self Employed_IEFP
Mean 3.488.889 6.608
Stand. Deviation 1.841.782 2.816.783
Variance 3.392.161.111 7.934.263.861
Kurtosis -0.807 -1.813
Shapiro-Wilk statistic W 0.935 0.877
Shapiro-Wilk p-value 0.531 0.146
Critical value of W (5% sig.level): 0.829 0.829
Table 4. Pearson Product Moment Correlation
Statistic Variable X = Public Expenditure Variable Y = Self-employed
Mean 348.888.888.888.889 660.811.111.111.111
Biased Variance 3015254320987.65 705.267.898.765.432
Biased Standard Deviation 173.644.876.716.466 265.568.804.411.481
Covariance
Correlation R
Determination R2
T-Test
p-value (2 sided)
p-value (1 sided)
95% CI of Correlation
Degrees of Freedom
Number of Observations 9
Pearson Product Moment Correlation - Ungrouped Data
151.306.638.888.889
0.291
0.806
0.446
0,22
[-0.461, 0.800]
7
0,09
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Graphic 1. Total Self Employed In Portugal (2005-2013)
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Graphic 2. Total Public Expenditure in IEFP’s Self Employment Creation Measures 
(2005-2013)
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Graphic 3. Total Public Expenditure in IEFP’s Self Employment Creation Measures 
and Self Employed Positions Created Through IEFP Measures (2005-2013)
7,00
12000 6,00
10000 5,00
8000 4,00
6000 3,00
4000 2,00
2000 1,00
0
2005 2006 20102007 20092008 2012 20132011
Se
lf-
em
pl
oy
m
en
t P
os
iti
on
s C
re
at
ed
 
Th
ro
ug
h I
EF
P 
M
ea
su
re
s
Pu
bl
ic
 Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 in
 IE
FP
's
 S
el
f 
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t C
re
at
io
n  
M
ea
su
re
s  
(M
€ )
Source: Own calculations using EUROSTAT/Labour Force Survey and IEFP data
Graphic 4. Scatterplot - Total Public Expenditure in IEFP’s Self Employment Creation 
Measures and Self Employed Positions Created Through IEFP Measures (2005-2013)
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